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Abstract. One of the most salient issues faced by platforms like newspapers
and credit card issuers is that users are heterogeneous in the value they bring
to other users or to the platform. We develop a model with multi-dimensional
heterogeneity where a monopoly platform chooses (price or non-price) instru-
ments. Users play two roles: 1) they are users of the platform’s services
with heterogeneous preferences over instruments and platform characteristics;
2) they make heterogeneous contributions that endogenously determine these
characteristics. The marginal (private or social) value of an instrument or
characteristic includes the classical direct impact on profit and on (relevant)
participants’ utilities, but also includes a novel sorting eﬀect of marginal users
and consequent further impact on platform characteristics. The sorting eﬀect
is quantified by the covariance, within the set of marginal users, between user
preferences and user contributions towards characteristics. The private opti-
mum departs from eﬃciency by prescribing lower quantities and catering to the
tastes of marginal (rather than average) users. Under reasonable conditions,
optimal allocations may be implemented uniquely by allowing each instrument
to be contingent on all characteristics. We discuss applications to newspapers,
broadcast media, credit cards, and suggest simple extensions to the case of
imperfect competition in insurance provision and college admissions.
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1. Introduction
Radio stations famously introduced melodramatic “soap operas” in the 1920s to
cater to the tastes of female listeners, since women had control over their fami-
lies’ purse strings and were therefore particularly valuable to advertisers. Similarly,
American Express’ premium travel services cater to the tastes of wealthy travelers,
since these are the customers most valuable to the expensive stores that generate
much of American Express’ revenues. As these examples illustrate, one of the most
salient features of “platform” industries, in which a firm’s user base functions also as
its selling point to other users, is the heterogeneity of the value generated by users.
Yet the economic literature has struggled to analyze how platforms select and im-
plement an optimal allocation when facing users heterogeneous in both preferences
and values.
In this paper we present a general, yet simple, treatment of this multi-dimensional
screening problem, based on empirically tractable moments of user heterogeneity,
specifically the covariance between marginal users’ preferences and their contribu-
tions to platform characteristics. Our framework can be adapted to the analysis
of several industries, illuminating common driving forces as well as crucial diﬀer-
ences. It establishes a link between the literatures on multi-sided platforms and
multi-dimensional screening, showing how issues in the two fields can be jointly
understood, generalized and simplified.
We model a monopoly platform (say, a newspaper) that can directly choose
the level of several instruments, possibly at a cost. For instance, these could be
the prices charged to readers and advertisers, or a non-price instrument like the
political slant of the newspaper. Users (readers and advertisers) may have het-
erogeneous preferences over these instruments, as some readers enjoy a conserva-
tive slant but others dislike it. Participating users make potentially heterogeneous
contributions towards several platform characteristics, which are thereby endoge-
nously determined. These may be, for instance, the number of readers (readers
make homogeneous contributions of 1), or the total wealth of the readership, where
heterogeneous contributions are more likely. These characteristics may be of some
direct value to the platform, as is the case regarding the total number of paying
readers. Additionally, users themselves may have heterogenous preferences over
platform characteristics, in which case these constitute consumption externalities.
For instance, a change in the readership’s total wealth may be highly valued by an
advertiser of luxury goods, but not as important to a seller of basic necessities. In
sum, we allow for heterogeneity of users in their preferences for characteristics and
instruments, as well as in their contributions towards determining the platform’s
characteristics.
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As in Weyl (2010) (henceforth, W10), users play two roles. On the one hand,
they are consumers of the platform’s services, to which the standard theory of mo-
nopoly (Cournot (1838)) may be applied. On the other hand, users determine plat-
form characteristics, making it useful to employ the analysis of a quality-choosing
monopolist of Spence (1975) since, by determining its participants, the platform
determines also the properties of the product it oﬀers to participants. However,
when users are heterogeneous in their contributions to characteristics, the platform
cares not only about diﬀerences in preferences, but also about the relationship be-
tween preferences and contributions. For this reason, our analysis will also be in
the spirit of Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) (henceforth, RS76), in which platforms
choose the levels of price and non-price instruments in order to attract the most
valuable users.
In our model, the marginal value of an instrument or characteristic has three
components. First, it impacts the revenues and costs of the platform. Second, it
aﬀects the utilities of participants, which is directly relevant for welfare maximiza-
tion, but is also taken into account by a profit maximizer to the extent that it can
capture users’ surplus. The key novel element is the third. Among users indiﬀerent
about participating (marginal users), a change in an instrument or characteristic
will attract those who enjoy the change, but repel those who dislike it, thereby
sorting participants. Depending on the contributions to characteristics of those
attracted and those repelled, this sorting of participants will have a subsequent
impact on characteristics. If those attracted make large positive contributions to
some characteristic and those repelled make small or negative contributions, then
the eﬀect of sorting will be to increase the level of that characteristic. Formally,
this will occur when there is positive covariance between marginal users’ preferences
for the change, and users’ contributions to the characteristic of interest. We use a
simplified environment to illustrate this mechanism in Section 3.
Because of these feedback eﬀects, the (private or social) marginal values of each
of the relevant characteristics must be determined simultaneously. We show in
Section 4 that the general solution is characterized by a system of equations that
can be described using three matrices. The first contains the marginal contributions
to characteristics that result from changes in the instruments; the second captures
the extent to which the feedback among characteristics causes these initial changes
to be self-reinforcing or self-defeating; the final matrix consists of the value of the
ultimate changes in the characteristics to users and the platform.
The private optimum distorts relative to the social optimum by having too little
user participation, in the spirit of Cournot (1838), and by catering to the tastes
of marginal, rather than average, users (as in Spence (1975)). In our simplest
setting, the distortions described by our model are conceptually equivalent to those
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obtained in W10, although diﬀerent in magnitude as the Spence (1975) distortion
is scaled by the sorting eﬀect. When we allow utility to be imperfectly transferable,
optimality conditions take into account the wedge that describes how eﬃciently the
platform transforms user surplus into profit. In two simple extensions to the case
of imperfect competition, the presence of assymetric information reveals distortions
and ineﬃciencies in the spirit of Akerlof (1970) and RS76.
Because users’ decisions depend on their expectations about the decisions of
other users, multiple equilibria may exist, as described by Rohlfs (1974). We con-
sider the platform’s implementation problem in Section 5. In a multi-sided setting
with quasi-linear utilities and homogeneous uni-dimensional values, W10 shows that
prices contingent on the number of users on each side can ensure that participation
on each side is unaﬀected by (“insulated” from) changes in every other side, thereby
producing uniqueness. We oﬀer a generalization where uniqueness is achieved by
making each of the platform’s instruments contingent on the levels of all charac-
teristics. Intuitively, this is possible when the joint power of instruments to aﬀect
each of the characteristics is suﬃciently large to counteract the self-reinforcing or
self-defeating feedback among characteristics. When this is the case, any change in
the expectation of users regarding the levels of the characteristics can be undone
by the platform’s appropriate use of its instruments, and therefore the platform
can garantee to users that its desired level of each characteristic will surely obtain.
Formally, this requires appropriate bounds on the eigenvalues of the matrix of ef-
fects of instruments on characteristics, and the matrix of eﬀects of characteristics
on themselves.
In Section 6, we illustrate the flexibility of our model by revisiting and general-
izing a number of previous results. By modelling a a newspaper faced with readers
heterogeneous in wealth and in preference for political slant, we are able to interpret
a robustness check of Gentzkow & Shapiro (2010) as meaning that the covariance
between readers’ preferences over slant and their wealth is close to zero. We model
a broadcast media platform in the style of Anderson & Coate (2005), where users
cannot be charged prices, but must instead be attracted by adjusting properties
of the platform’s media. Because utility is imperfectly transferable, the platform’s
profit maximizing conditions take into account the wedge between user surplus and
the corresponding platform profit. We combine elements of Bedre-Defolie & Cal-
vano (2010) and Rochet & Stole (2002) in modelling a credit card issuer’s choice of
a non-linear tariﬀ to apply to card-carrying users, whose heterogeneous number of
transactions depends endogenously on the tariﬀ. The platform’s per transaction fee
caters to the tastes of marginal users but considers also the change in consumption
by infra-marginals, thereby combining the logics of Spence (1975) and Mussa &
Rosen (1978). Our fourth example is a simple extension to the case of imperfect
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competition, in the spirit of RS76, where we quantify in an empirically tractable
way that paper’s cream-skimming distortion and propensity for market faillure.
Our final example addresses the competitive matching of students to colleges in the
spirit of Gale & Shapley (1962). We build upon the framework of Azevedo (2011)
by allowing colleges’ preferences to consider properties of their entire student pool,
rather than just individual students.
2. Literature
Our paper draws from (and links) the literatures on multi-sided platforms and
multi-dimensional screening. The majority of the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture on platforms assumes users are homogeneous in the value they generate (Rys-
man (2009) oﬀers a thorough survey), although some recent papers have relaxed this
assumption. On the empirical side, Tucker (2008), Ryan & Tucker (2010), Cantillon
& Yin (2008) and Lee (2010) have found strong evidence for heterogeneity of exter-
nalities in video-conferencing technology, stock exchanges and video game markets,
but have not considered optimal firm responses to this as we do. On the theoretical
side, Chandra & Collard-Wexler (2009) and Athey et al. (2010) consider tightly pa-
rameterized models of platform competition in which one-dimensional heterogeneity
plays a role, in contrast to our multi-dimensional approach. More closely related,
Hagiu (2009), Gomes (2009) and Jeon & Rochet (2010), discuss the value of screen-
ing out low-value users, but consider explicit (“third-degree”) mechanisms, while
we focus on implicit (“second-degree”) screening by means of product characteris-
tics. Gomes & Pavan (2011) consider implicit screening in a multi-sided platform
setting, but assume a single dimension of preference and value heterogeneity, which
rules out the sorting eﬀect we describe and makes their analysis closer to the classic
theory of screening of Mussa & Rosen (1978).
By contrast, the literature on multi-dimensional screening (Armstrong & Rochet
(1999), Rochet & Chone (1998), Rochet & Stole (2002),Rochet & Stole (2003)) has
tended to allow for multi-dimensional heterogeneity of preferences and instruments.
On the other hand, unlike our paper, it does not study environments with consump-
tion externalities, nor does it emphasize comparative statics, and it often maintains
strict assumptions about the parametrization of preferences. This literature also
tends to be mathematically complex, in contrast to our reliance on simple primitives
of user heterogeneity. However, our approach is more restrictive than this litera-
ture in that we only allow finite-dimensional instruments and focus on discrete user
decisions. While these are important limitations, non-linear price schedules are
typically well approximated by tariﬀs of only a few parts, which are possible in our
setting (see Wilson (1993)).
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Our paper can be seen in the tradition of Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976), since
we allow firms to use both price and non-price instruments to screen users with
heterogeneous (private or social) values. However, their analysis relies on uni-
dimensional heterogeneity, with a single parameter determining both preferences
and values, and relying on the classic Spence (1973)-Mirrlees (1971) single crossing
condition to determine the relationship between the two. In our multi-dimensional
environment, this condition is replaced by the covariance between users’ preferences
and their contributions to characteristics. Our flexible setup is able to quantify the
eﬀect of competition on the propensity for market shutdown and the size of the
cream-skimming distortions present in that paper. Moreover, the sorting eﬀect we
describe requires multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
Three recent papers closely related to ours are Einav et al. (2010), Einav et al.
(2011) and Weyl & Tirole (2011). In the first, users have multi-dimensional types
but insurers choose only the prices charged for otherwise fixed contracts. Since
welfare maximization depends on the marginal cost of coverage, while competitive
prices are equated to average costs, ineﬃciencies arise from competition due to ad-
verse or advantageous selection, and markets may be excessively or insuﬃciently
covered, which generalizes the logic of Akerlof (1970). However, this paper does
not allow insurers to determine their coverage and assumes the cost of coverage
is fixed for each user.2 Einav et al. (2011) model a firm screening clients with
multi-dimensional heterogeneity, by use of multiple instruments, and derive profit
maximizing conditions based on the elasticities of revenues and costs to changes
in the instruments. Unlike our paper, they do not tie their solutions to the distri-
bution of user heterogeneity, do not consider departures from eﬃciency by profit
maximizers, nor do they consider the platform environment we focus on. Weyl &
Tirole (2011) consider the use of market power to screen innovations, obtaining a
characterization in terms of a covariance between innovation characteristics related
to our formula, but do not consider the multi-sided feedback of characteristics that
we describe. Their instruments, and thus their optimality conditions, are more
specific than those we consider, so their paper can be thought of as providing a
contract theoretical micro-foundation for a possible application of the sorting logic
of our model.
3. A Simple Example
In this section, we present a simple illustration of the main ingredients of our
approach. To that eﬀect, we make several assumptions that are relaxed in Section
4. We will consider the example of a cell phone service provider faced with users
2Einav & Finkelstein (2011) oﬀers an intuitive graphical analysis of the same phenomena.
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heterogeneous in their propensity to make calls and in their preferences for the
popularity of the network.
There is a continuum of potential phone users, with mass normalized to 1. Each
user has a unique “type” θ ∈ RT , a T -dimensional vector of user characteristics,
which is each user’s private information. Types are distributed in the population
according to a continuous and atomless probability density function f(θ) (hereafter,
θ ∼ f), which is common knowledge.
A monopoly phone service provider chooses the level of its instrument, the uni-
form participation price P . Users decide whether or not to join the platform’s
phone network based on P and on their expectation of a platform characteristic
K. In this context, K can be the phone network’s overall popularity among users.
Given (P,K), if the user with type θ (hereafter, “user θ”) participates, she obtains
quasi-linear utility u ≡ v(K;θ) − P. Outside options are normalized to zero, so
the set of participating users is Θ ≡ {θ : v(K;θ) ≥ P} , assuming Θ is measurable.
The boundary of Θ constitutes the set of marginal users, who are indiﬀerent about
participating, and it is denoted ∂Θ ≡ {θ : v(K;θ) = P} .
The platform’s popularity (K) is endogenously determined by the participants.
User θ makes a contribution k(θ) to K. One can think of k(θ) as user θ’s likeliness
to make phone calls, or her individual popularity. The platform’s overall popularity
is K ≡ ￿θ∈Θ k(θ)f(θ)dθ.3 Assuming k (θ) : RT → R is continuous and bounded
insures the integral is well behaved.
The share of participants is N ≡ ￿θ∈Θ f(θ)dθ. It will be useful to define the
density of marginal users as M ≡ ￿t∈∂Θ f(t)dt, because it captures the sensitivity
of the set of participants to changes in the P and K.4 The platform’s profit is
Π ≡ NP − C(N), where dC/dN = C ￿ is the marginal cost of an additional user.
That is, the platform values popularity only to the extent that it attracts paying
users. By quasi-linearity, social welfare is W ≡ ￿θ∈Θ v(K;θ)f(θ)dθ − C(N).
We assume that, if there are multiple equilibria, the platform can choose its most
preferred allocation, and we focus on the necessary conditions under which a choice
of P is welfare- or profit maximizing. We will also assume that a local change in P
has a local impact on the corresponding level ofK, thereby preventing discontinuous
changes in the equilibrium. We will omit functional arguments without ambiguity
(for instance,
￿
θ∈Θ f(θ)dθ ≡
￿
Θ f).
3Since Θ depends on K, then K is a fixed point of the function
￿
Θ kf . The implications of this
are addressed in Section 5.
4One should think of M as (a component of) the derivative of the set of participants with respect
to parameters, not a subset of participants per se. For instance, dN/dP = −M . Its analogue, in
models of uni-dimensional heterogeneity, is the density (f) evaluated at the (unique) marginal
user. See Flanders (1973) for details.
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First, we consider a platform’s choice of a welfare maximizing price. Letting λW
be the social value of an additional unit of popularity, the classical analysis of Pigou
(1912) shows that the socially optimal price must be equated to the marginal cost
of an additional user, net of the social value of the externality that user generates,
or
P − C ￿ = − ￿k￿￿￿￿
popularity of
typical marginal user
· λW￿￿￿￿
marginal social value
of popularity
where ￿k = E [k(θ) | θ ∈ ∂Θ] is the popularity contributed by the typical marginal
user.
In turn, the marginal social value of popularity is the externality this generates
to all participants, in addition to the value of popularity in further attracting or
repelling users, which then has a feedback eﬀect on popularity itself. This eﬀect
will be positive when the attracted users are themselves popular and repelled users
are unpopular. Formally, this means
λW = NvK￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
all users
+ λWMσ￿ ￿￿ ￿
social feedback
value of popularity
where vK = E [vK(θ) | θ ∈ Θ] is the marginal valuation for popularity of the aver-
age user, and σ = Cov(vK , k | θ ∈ ∂Θ) is the covariance, within the set of marginal
users, between valuation of network popularity (vK) and individual contribution to
popularity (k). This term therefore captures the extent to which the popularity is
self-reinforcing or self-defeating. Our first result follows immediately:
Proposition 1. A welfare maximizing platform sets its price so that
(1) P − C ￿ = − ￿k￿￿￿￿
popularity of
typical marginal user
· 1
1−Mσ￿ ￿￿ ￿
sorting
multiplier
· NvK￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
all users
Proof. We re-state the problem as maxP,KW , subject to
￿
Θ kf = K. The La-
grangian is L = W + λW ￿￿Θ qf −Q￿. First Order Conditions (FOCs) are dLdP =
−M (P − C ￿)−λWM￿q = 0 and dLdK = M￿vK (P − C ￿)+NvK+λW ￿M￿vKk − 1￿ = 0.
Eliminating λW and using σ = ￿vKk − ￿vK￿k concludes. ￿
As expected, a welfare maximizing platform equates price to marginal cost, net of
the social value of the externality generated by an additional (necessarily marginal)
user. The value of this externality is intuitively determined by the contribution to
popularity of the typical marginal user (￿k), and by the extent to which overall users
enjoy popularity (NvK), the sign of vK determining if the externality is positive or
negative.
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The sorting multiplier 1/1−Mσ captures the sorting eﬀect of an increase in pop-
ularity and it is proportional to σ, the covariance between appreciation for, and
contribution to, popularity. Following an initial increase in popularity, among mar-
ginal users, those who enjoy popularity will be attracted into participating, those
who dislike it being repelled. This way, increasing popularity will sort for marginal
users who enjoy it. If these attracted users are themselves individually popular, and
repelled users are unpopular, sorting will cause popularity to be self-reinforcing, so
the social value of the popularity generated by an additional users will be scaled up-
wards, as the sorting multiplier will be greater than 1. Conversely, if attracted users
make low contributions, while repelled users make large positive contributions, the
sorting eﬀect would cause an initial increase in popularity to be self-defeating, so
the social value of additional popularity is scaled down by 1/1−Mσ < 1. The eﬀect
of sorting will therefore intuitively depend on the relationship between appreciation
and generation ofK among marginal users and, formally, on the covariance between
these quantities within the set of marginal users. Intuitively, the eﬀect will also be
larger when the density of marginal users (M) is larger.
For concreteness, if users are either “hot shots” (popular users who enjoy a pop-
ular network) or “loners” (unpopular users with little use for a popular network),
then σ > 0 and 1/1−Mσ > 1. An initial increase in popularity attracts “hot shots”
and repels “loners” causing popularity to be self-reinforcing. If instead users are
either “telemarketers” (who enjoy a popular network, but disturb other users), and
“customer service reps” (whom everyone wants to call, but who dislike being both-
ered), then σ < 0 and 1/1−Mσ < 1. In this case, and an initial increase in popularity
would attract “telemarketers” but repel the “customer service reps,” so an initial
increase in K is partly undone by the sorting eﬀect.
The sorting multiplier
1
1−Mσ = 1 + Mσ￿￿￿￿
first round
of sorting
+ M2σ2￿ ￿￿ ￿
second round
of sorting
+...
can be understood as an the infinite series of eﬀects, the first term corresponding to
the weight of the initial change in K, and each successive term corresponding to the
weight of the changes in K produced by the successive rounds of sorting.5 When
σ > 0, an initial increase in K will generate, by sorting, some additional popularity
proportionally to Mσ, which in turn will produce some additional popularity, this
time proportionally to M2σ2. When σ < 0, the initial increase in K is partly oﬀset
by a decrease in K in the first round of sorting, but that in turn will produce a
small increase in K, captured by Mσ2 > 0.
5|Mσ| < 1 will be true for any stable equilibrium.
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Let us now address the price chosen by a profit maximizer. Let λΠ be the private
value of an additional unit of popularity to this platform. Classical theory prescribes
that the profit maximizing price must be such that marginal revenue is equated to
marginal cost, net of the value to the platform of the externality generated by a
marginal user. If P − N/M = P − µ is marginal revenue, then
P − µ￿ ￿￿ ￿
marginal
revenue
−C ￿ = − ￿k￿￿￿￿
popularity of
typical marginal user
· λΠ￿￿￿￿
marginal private value
of popularity
Moreover, the private value of an additional unit of popularity (λΠ) must equal
the value of the externality this generates to users, to the extent that this can be
captured by the platform, in addition to the continuation value of K in generating
additional popularity, as above. By using uniform prices, the platform is able to
extract, from all participants (N), the increase in surplus experienced by marginal
users, so the former is equal to N￿vK . The latter is again determined by the sorting
eﬀect, which now has a value to the platform of λΠ per unit:
λΠ = N￿vK￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality captured
by platform
+ λΠMσ￿ ￿￿ ￿
private feedback
value of popularity
The second result follows:
Proposition 2. A profit maximizing platform sets its price so that
(2) P −µ￿￿￿￿
Cournot
distortion
−C ￿ = −￿k 1
1−MσN · ￿vK￿￿￿￿
Spence
distortion
Proof. We set up the problem as a constrained maximization (as above), with
Lagrangian L = Π + λΠ ￿￿Θ qf −Q￿. The FOCs are dLdP = −M (P − C ￿) + N −
λM￿q = 0 and dLdK = M￿vK (P − C ￿) + λΠ ￿M￿vKk − 1￿ = 0. Eliminating λΠ using
the definition of σ and µ = N/M concludes. ￿
A profit maximizing monopoly equates marginal revenue to marginal cost net
of externalities, the latter being determined by the preferences of marginal users.
The term −µ = N · dP/dN illustrates the classical distortion of quantities downward
from the social optimum by a profit maximizer described by Cournot (1838).
Moreover, the welfare maximizing platform of Equation 1 considers the externali-
ties to all participants (NuK), but a profit maximizer considers only the preferences
of marginal users (N￿uK), because their surplus can be entirely extracted by the
adjustment of P . The catering to the tastes of marginal users, rather than average
users, by a profit maximizer is as described by Spence (1975).
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Unlike the Cournot distortion, the direction of the Spence distortion is not fixed.
If marginal users enjoy popularity more than the average users (￿uK > uK), a profit
maximizer will tend be ineﬃciently popular, and vice-versa. Moreover, the Spence
distortion is scaled by the sorting eﬀect. If marginal users enjoy popularity less than
average users (￿uK < uK), the platform will tend to have an ineﬃciently low level
of popularity. However, if σ < 0, when the platform attempts to set this low level
of popularity, it attracts marginal users who generate a great deal of popularity,
thereby increasing overall popularity and mitigating the Spence distortion. this is
formally illustrated by the fact that σ < 0 implies 1/1−Mσ < 1. Notice however,
that it is certainly possible that the Spence distortion is exacerbated.
In this simple example, all distortions are conceptually akin to those described
by W10, and indeed our results reduce to those of that paper when users are
homogenous (σ = 0). Additional eﬀects will arise in the more complex environments
of Sections 4 and 6.
4. The General Case
The model presented in Section 3 contains a number of important limitations:
• There is a unique instrument available to the platform.
• A unique platform characteristic enters users’ utilities.
• Users respond homogeneously to changes in the instrument.
• Individual user contributions to characteristics are fixed.
• Utility is perfectly transferable between users and the platform.
• The platform’s preferences does not depend on any characteristic that users
care about.
In this section, we present a model that preserves the logic of Section 3 but relaxes
these assumptions. The usefulness of this generality is illustrated in the applications
of Section 6. However, we maintain two crucial assumptions. First, user decisions
are discrete. This can be relaxed in simple cases, as illustrated in Sub-Section
6.3, but not generally.6 Second, platform characteristics are linear aggregations of
individual contributions, although individual contributions may respond to changes
in the instruments or characteristics. Although our specification covers a large
number of scenarios, we assume it is with some loss of generality.
4.1. Setup. There is a continuum of users, of mass normalized to 1. Each user
has a type θ ∈ RT that is her private information, and types are distributed in
the population of users according to a continuous and atomless probability density
function f(θ), which is common knowledge.7
6See Fabinger & Weyl (2012) on this issue.
7These assumptions are primarily technical, but also economically plausible in that they suggest
that no two users are exactly alike.
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A monopoly platform chooses ρ =
￿
ρ1, ..., ρl, ...
￿ ∈ RP , a vector of P instru-
ments with components indexed by l ∈ {1, 2, ..,P}. Users decide whether to join
the platform based on ρ and on their expectation of K, a vector of K platform
characteristics determined endogenously by the participants. Given (ρ,K), if users
θ joins the platform, she obtains utility u(ρ,K;θ), assumed continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in (ρ,K).
Non-participants obtain zero utility. Then Θ ≡ {θ : u(ρ,K;θ) ≥ 0} is the
set of participants, assumed measurable. The set of marginal users is ∂Θ ≡
{θ : u(ρ,K;θ) = 0} . The share participating users is N ≡ ￿Θ f and the density
of the margin is M ≡ ￿∂Θ f . We also define µ = N/M.
Let K =
￿
K1, ...,Ki, ...
￿ ∈ RK be the vector of K characteristics, with com-
ponents indexed by i, j ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. Given (ρ,K), if user θ participates, she
makes an individual contribution ki(ρ,K,θ) to characteristic Ki. We define Ki
as Ki ≡ ￿Θ ki(ρ,K,θ)f(θ)dθ. Assuming ki : RP+K+T → R is continuous in all
arguments, bounded, and continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to (ρ,K) assures
the convergence and diﬀerentiability of Ki.
We assume that, in equilibrium, user expectations of K are correct, so K is a
fixed point of the function κ (ρ,K) : RP+K → RK, the K components of which are
the integrals defined above for each Ki. The fixed-point nature of K illustrates
the potential multiplicity of equilibria common in environments with consumption
externalities. In this section, we assume that the platform can choose its preferred
equilibrium among all feasible equilibria, and discuss the conditions necessary for
uniqueness in Section 5. We also assume the instruments (ρ) do not permit indi-
vidual contributions ki to be contractible by the platform. 8
The vector K includes all characteristics that enter users’ preferences. For a
characteristic (say, L) that enters only the platform’s preferences, then L (ρ,K)
so the platform’s profit can always be expressed as Π (ρ,K). Social welfare is
W =
￿
Θ uf +Π.
We focus on the necessary FOCs for social and private optimality, and assume
that the platform can select its preferred equilibrium in the case of multiplicity. Sec-
tion 5 addresses the conditions necessary for unique implementation, under which
the necessary conditions are suﬃcient. We continue to assume that local changes
in ρ imply local changes in the corresponding equilibrium levels of K.
We also use the following notation:
8Contributions ki are usually unobservable, much like preferences are. Alternatively, the platform
might make observations of ki with idiosyncratic noise, or there might be resales of the platform’s
product among users, making discrimination ineﬀective.
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• Σuρ,k is the matrix of covariances between valuations for instruments and
contributions to characteristics. It has dimension P×K and generic element
σuρl ,ki = Cov(uρl , k
i | ∂Θ).
• ΣuK ,k is the matrix of covariances between valuations for characteristics
and contributions to characteristics. It has dimension K2 and the element
in row i and column j is σuKi ,kj = Cov(uKi , k
j | ∂Θ).
• kρ is the matrix of eﬀects of instruments on individual contributions. It
has dimension P ×K and generic element kiρl = E
￿
dki/dρl | θ ∈ Θ￿.
• kK is the matrix of eﬀects of characteristics on individual contributions.
It has dimension K2 and the element in row i and column j is kiKj =
E
￿
dki/dKj | θ ∈ Θ￿.
• uρ is the diagonal matrix of average valuations for instruments. It has
dimension P2 and generic element uρl .
• uK is the diagonal matrix of average valuations for characteristics. It has
dimension K2 and generic element uKi .
• ￿uρ is the diagonal matrix of valuations for the instruments by the typical
marginal user. It has dimension P2 and generic element ￿uρl .
• ￿uK is the diagonal matrix of valuations for the characteristics by the typical
marginal user. It has dimension K2 and generic element ￿uKi .
• ￿k is the K-dimensional row vector of contributions to the characteristics.
It has generic element ￿ki.
• 1A is the column vector of dimension A ∈ N, where every entry is 1.
• ΠK is the K-dimensional column vector of marginal impacts of each of the
characteristics on platform profit. Its generic element is ΠKi = dΠ/dKi.
• Πρ is the P-dimensional column vector of marginal impacts of each of the
instruments on platform profit. Its generic element is Πρl = dΠ/dρl.
4.2. Welfare Maximization. We consider a platform choosing (ρ,K) to maxi-
mize W , subject to the K constraints ￿Θ kif = Ki, for i ∈ {1, ...,K}. Let λWi
be the Lagrange multiplier on Ki, and λW the column vector containing these
multipliers. The Lagrangian is LW = W +￿Ki=1 ￿￿Θ kif −Ki￿λWi.
The FOC for ρl is dLW/dρl = Nuρl+M ￿uρlu+Πρl+￿Ki=1 ￿M￿uρlki +Nkiρl￿λi =
0.9 Since
￿
∂Θ uρluf = 0 and￿uρlki = σuρl ,ki + ￿uρl ￿ki, we obtain
1￿uρl ￿Nuρl +Πρl￿+ 1￿uρl
K￿
i=1
￿
Mσuρl ,ki +Nk
i
ρl
￿
λWi = −M
K￿
i=1
￿kiλWi
9Notice that, in taking each of these derivatives, onlyK (characteristics entering user preferences)
are held fixed, the eﬀect of ρl on characteristics entering only the platform’s preferences subsumed
in Πρl .
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The covariance between marginal users’ preferences and contributions (σuρl ,ki) now
plays a role because users have heterogeneous preferences over instruments, not just
characteristics. These P FOCs can then be expressed as the matrix equation
￿uρ−1 (Nuρ1P +Πρ) + ￿uρ−1 ￿MΣuρ,k +Nkρ￿λW = −M1P￿kλW
Similarly, the FOC with respect to Ki is dL
W
dKi = NuKi + M￿uKiu + ΠKi +￿E
j=1 λ
j
￿
M￿uKikj +NkjKi − 1
￿
= 0, and these K equations can be expressed as
￿uK−1 (NuK1K +ΠK) + ￿uK−1 ￿MΣuK ,k +NkK − IK￿λW = −M1K￿kλW
where IK is the K2 identity matrix.
We obtain a system with P + K equations, from which we must eliminate K
unknowns (the elements of λW ) and then solve for P unknowns (the elements of
ρ). This is always possible, but is especially straightforward when P = K. The
vectors on the right hand side (RHS) of both equations have the scalar M￿kλW for
every entry and, when P = K, the two vectors have the same dimension and the
two left hand sides (LHSs) can be identified to solve for λW . We focus on this
case for clarity. When P > K, we can simply consider P − K times an irrelevant
characteristic (denoted K0), which enters no preferences and to which all agents
make zero contributions, as we illustrate in Section 6. Using the result for λW on
the first matrix equation and using the definition of the “excess covariance” matrix
ΣuK−uρ,k = ΣuK ,k − ￿uK￿uρ−1Σuρ,k and the “intensive eﬀect” matrix kK−ρ =
kK − ￿uK￿uρ−1kρ, we obtain the first general result:
Proposition 3. The welfare maximizing choice of ρ satisfies
(3)
1
M
￿uρ−1 (Nuρ1P +Πρ)￿ ￿￿ ￿
marginal net
social benefit
= − ∆￿￿￿￿
marginal
contribution
Γ−1￿￿￿￿
feedback
multiplier
EW￿￿￿￿
social value
of externalities
where
∆ = 1P￿k+ ￿uρ−1Σuρ,k￿ ￿￿ ￿
extensive
marginal contribution
+ µ￿uρ−1kρ￿ ￿￿ ￿
intensive
marginal contribution
Γ = IK − MΣuk−uρ,k￿ ￿￿ ￿
extensive feedback
(sorting)
− NkK−ρ￿ ￿￿ ￿
intensive feedback
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EW = ΠK − ￿uK￿uρ−1Πρ￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
platform
+N
￿
uK1K − ￿uK￿uρ−1uρ1P￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
users
Although complex, the structure of this formula is that of standard Pigouvian
pricing. Let us consider first the LHS. In Section 3, welfare maximization equated
the direct net social benefit of including an additional user (P−C ￿) to the negative of
the externality generated by that user. Similarly here, the l-th entry of the column
vector on the LHS is the direct social benefit of a marginal increase in instrument ρl
that attracts an additional user: (Nuρl+Πρl)/M￿uρl . The denominator is clearly the
impact on users and the platform of a change in ρl, whereas the numerator captures
the change in ρl necessary to attract an additional user. Presenting the solution
in terms of an additional marginal user (rather than, for instance, in terms of a
unit increase in ρl) allows for clear comparaisons with Section 3 and with most of
the economic literature. For instance, when the instrument is uniform price P and
utilities are quasilinear, we recover the result of Section 3: −N+N+(−M)(P−C
￿)
−M =
P − C ￿.
The RHS of the equation captures 1) the marginal contributions to all charac-
teristics of the typical user attracted by a change in ρ, 2) the feedback eﬀect among
characteristics and 3) the social value of the ultimate changes in characteristics for
both users and the platform. The matrix ∆ captures the first eﬀect. The l-th
entry of the column vector ∆1P captures the contributions to all characteristics
by the average user attracted by an increase in ρl:
￿K
i=1
￿￿ki + σuρl ,ki +Nkiρl￿.
The average attracted user contributes ￿ki to characteristics Ki but, since users are
heterogeneously attracted by ρl, this eﬀect must be correct by σuρl ,ki . One must
then also consider that a change in ρl may aﬀect the individual contributions of
all (N) users to Ki, hence the term Nkiρl . When users respond homogeneously to
price and individual contributions are fixed, then σuP ,k = kP = 0 and we obtain
the familiar result ￿k.
The second term (Γ−1) captures the feedback eﬀects among characteristics, al-
though the matrix Γ is easier to analyze in this context. The j-th entry of the
vector Γ1K is an (inverse) measure of the feedback eﬀect of some characteris-
tic Kj on all other characteristics Ki, including the eﬀect of Kj on itself: 1 −
M
￿K
i=1
￿
σuKj ,ki − ￿uKj/￿uρj · σuρj ,ki
￿
− N￿Ki=1 ￿dki/dKj − ￿uKj/￿uρj · dki/dρj￿. The
first summation captures the sorting (or “extensive”) eﬀect of Kj , stemming from
users being attracted into or out of participation along the margin, and is there-
fore proportional to M . Every characteristic ki increases proportionally to σuKj ,ki .
However, as discussed above, the FOC is expressed in terms of the impact of an
additional marginal user, so the platform’s envelope conditions for its instrument ρl
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prescribe that it adjusts to maintain the number of participants fixed. This adjust-
ment is intuitively proportional to ￿uKj/￿uρj and, because users react heterogeneously
to instruments, it has an additional impact on ki of σuρj ,ki . The “excess covari-
ance” matrix Σuk−uρ,k therefore captures the extent to which the preferences of
the average user attracted by K covaries with her contributions towards K. The
“intensive” eﬀect of Kj on the characteristics consists of its impact on the individual
contributions (dki/dKj) of all users (N). Again, instruments adjust in the manner
described above which results in the additional term ￿uKj/￿uρj · dki/dρj. When users
respond homogeneously to an instrument and contributions are fixed, as in Section
3, then σuρj ,ki = k
i
ρl = k
i
Kj = 0 and we obtain 1 −MσuK ,k. The infinite series
Γ−1 converges when the matrix Γ is positive definite. Intuitively, this means that
there is no characteristic that, by means of the feedback between all characteris-
tics, is self-reinforcing to the point of being “explosive.” This will be true at any
stable optimum, otherwise an arbitrarily small initial change in K would generate
an unbounded response.
The column vector EW captures the marginal value of the ultimate change inK
to both users and the platform. This depends on their valuations (NuK+ΠK) but
also on how ρ changes to fix the number of participants (−￿uρ−1￿uK (Nuρ +Πρ)).
In Section 3, this becomes NuK +M￿uK(P −C ￿) + −￿uK(−N+N−M(P−C￿))−1 = NuK .
4.3. Profit Maximization. Consider now a platform’s choice of (ρ,K) to max-
imize Π, subject to the K constraints ￿Θ kif = Ki, for i ∈ {1, ...,K}. Let λΠi be
the Lagrange multiplier associated with Ki and λΠ be the K-dimensional column
vector of these multipliers. The Lagrangian is LΠ = Π+￿Ki=1 ￿￿Θ kif −Ki￿λΠi.
Proceeding as above, one can express the P FOCs with respect to ρ and the K
FOCs with respect to K, respectively, as
￿uρ−1Πρ + ￿uρ−1 ￿MΣuρ,k +Nkρ￿λΠ = −M1P￿kλΠ
￿uK−1ΠK + ￿uK−1 ￿MΣuK ,k +NkK − IK￿λΠ = −M1K￿kλΠ
Assuming P = K, we can eliminate λΠ as above and obtain the second general
result:
Proposition 4. The profit maximizing choice of ρ satisfies
(4)
1
M
(￿uρ)−1Πρ￿ ￿￿ ￿
marginal net
private benefit
= − ∆￿￿￿￿
marginal
contribution
Γ−1￿￿￿￿
feedback
multiplier
EΠ￿￿￿￿
private value
of externalities
where ∆,Γ are defined as above and
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EΠ = ΠK − ￿uK (￿uρ)−1Πρ
Here, the l-th entry of the vector on the LHS is the private direct net gains
to the platform from increasing ρl enough to attract an additional user. In the
environment of Section 3 this becomes −(N−M(P−C
￿))
M = P − µ − C ￿. Regarding
the RHS, the marginal contribution to each of the characteristics by the typical
marginal user attracted by a change in ρ (∆) and the feedback multiplier matrix
(Γ−1) are unchanged between Equations 3 and 4. However, a profit maximizer
considers the private value of a change in K (EΠ), which ignores the eﬀects on the
utility of users. In the simpler environment, this term becomes M￿uK(P − C ￿) −￿uK(N−M(P−C￿))
−1 = N￿uK .
4.4. A Multi-Sided Platform. The results above can describe a typical multi-
sided platform faced with users with heterogeneous values. We do this by partition-
ing the set of possible users (with types θ ∼ f and θ ∈ RT ) into S sub-sets, called
“sides,” and indexed by s ∈ {1, 2, ...,S}. We normalize the mass of each side to 1.
We let θ =
￿
θ1, ...,θs, ...,θS
￿
, such that, for users on side s , only the component
θs ∈ RT s is relevant (and T =￿Ss=1 T s). Then θs ∼ fs where fs is the PDF of θ
conditional on side s.
Users on side s are charged a uniform participation price P s by the platform,
and participating users obtain utility us = vs (K;θs) − P s. The vector K =￿
K1, ..,KS
￿
consists of S endogenously determined platform characteristics. The
set of participants is Θ = ∪Ss=1Θs, where Θs = {θs : vs (K;θs) ≥ P s} and ∂Θs =
{θs : vs (K;θs) = P s}. User θs makes a contribution ks(θs) to Ks and we define
Ks =
￿
Θ k
sf =
￿
Θs k
sfs . That is, only users on side s respond to changes in P s
and make non-zero contributions to Ks. We define Ns ≡ ￿Θs fs, Ms ≡ ￿∂Θs fs
and V s ≡ ￿∂Θs vsfs. Here, for instance, NuKi =￿Ss=1NsusKi .
LetM be the S2 diagonal matrix with generic elementMs, and letN ,P ,C￿,µ,V
be the S-dimensional column vectors with generic elements Ns, P s, dC/dNs,Ns/Ms,
and V s respectively. The (non-diagonal) matrix uK has, on its i-th row and j-th
column, the element ￿uiKj , and ￿uK is defined similarly. The platform’s profit is
Π =NTP − C(N) and social welfare is W = V T1S − C(N).
To apply Equations 3 and 4, notice first that Σuρ,k = kK = kρ = 0, so Γ =
IK −MΣuK ,k. Moreover, Πρ = N −M(P − C￿) and ΠK = M￿uK(P − C￿).
Then, the welfare and profit maximizing conditions are, respectively,
P −C￿ = −1S￿kΓ−1uKN
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P −µ￿￿￿￿
Cournot
distortion
−C￿ = −1S￿kΓ−1 ￿uK￿￿￿￿
Spence
distortion
N
These are easily recognizable extensions of Section 3, including the Cournot
(1838) and Spence (1975) distortions. Notice that, in W10, ki = 1 and Ki = N i,
so ΣuK ,k = 0 and Γ = IK.
5. Implementation
The presence of consumption externalities tends to produce multiple equilibria,
since the decision of each user depends on her expectations about the decisions of
other users, as pointed out by Rohlfs (1974) and emphasized by Katz & Shapiro
(1985). W10 addresses this issue in a quasi-linear multi-sided setting, where the
only relevant characteristic is the number of users. Uniqueness can then be achieved
by allowing each price to be contingent on the number of users on every side, which
can be thought of as a reduced-form way of modeling dynamic pricing behavior,
as discussed in White & Weyl (2011) and Cabral (2011). For instance, a credit
card issuer may charge low fees to merchants until it secures a critical mass of
users, raising fees afterwards. Contingent pricing can ensure uniqueness by making
the number of users on each side invariant to (“insulated” from) changes in the
number of users on other sides. This also addresses the “chicken-and-egg” problem
of Caillaud & Jullien (2003), where a platform needs a critical mass of users to
turn a profit, but users do not join unless this critical mass is already present.
The “insulating tariﬀ” of W10 prescribes that, for any profile of users expectations
about participation on each side, P I will adjust so that the realized profile of
participation is always the one chosen by the platform. Since users are correct
about participation in equilibrium, the only equilibrium is the platform’s desired
allocation. Formally, for two sides I and J , the contingent price function P I(·) is
chosen such that dNI/dNJ = ∂NI/∂NJ + dNI/dP I · dP I/dNJ = 0, and dNI/dNI = 1.
The technique is not immediately applicable here for three reasons. First, users
in our model respond heterogeneously to instruments, and a given subset of users
may respond to several instruments. We also allow users to make heterogeneous
contributions and to contribute to several characteristics. In particular, W10 as-
sumes that contributions are always positive and fixed, and that a user’s response to
the instrument (price) is negative and fixed, which implies that an increase in price
always strictly reduces the number of users on a given side. The third diﬀerence,
related to these two but deserving emphasis, is that in W10, for each characteristic
(number of participants on a given side), there was a single instrument (price on
that side) aﬀecting its level, and vice-versa.
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Nonetheless, the notion of insulation is still intuitive in our environment. A
newspaper may increase prices to advertisers after it secures a wealthy readership,
and a search engine may oﬀer higher quality searches to users if it starts accepting
advertisers which are particularly distracting.
Formally, insulation in our setting requires choosing the derivatives of each in-
strument with respect to all characteristics (the matrix dρ/dKT ), such that dK/dKT =
IK. This implies
(5)
dρ
dKT
=
dK
dρ
−1￿
IK − ∂K
∂KT
￿
=
￿
M￿uρk +Nkρ￿−1 ￿IK −M￿uKk −NkK￿
where ￿uρk has dimension P × K and generic entry￿uρlki, and similarly for￿uKk.
Notice that all instruments ρ insulate jointly, rather than each instrument being
responsible for a particular characteristic, as in W10. Intuitively, this formula
can be understood as meaning that instruments must react to changes in user
expectations (dρ/dKT ) such that the eﬀect of user expectations on characteristics
(IK−∂K/∂KT ) is “undone” by the eﬀect of instruments on characteristics (dK/dρ)−1.
Immediately, the invertibility of the K × P matrix dK/dρ requires P = K. That
is, the number of instruments must equal the number of characteristics relevant
to users.10 It is easy to see that insulation is impossible when P < K. For
instance, consider characteristics K1 and K2 but only instrument ρ1. Then, in-
sulation (dK1/dK1 = 1,dK2/dK1 = 0) requires dρ1/dK1 =
￿
1−M￿uK1k1
￿
/M￿uρ1k1 =
−M￿uK1k2/M￿uρ1k2. When P > K, the platform may be able to ignore some of its
instruments and still implement its desiredK￿ and, in fact, there might be multiple
ways to achieve insulation. For instance, consider a market with sides i ∈ {A,B},
where users on side i have types θi and care about the number of users on the
opposite side, j ￿= i. The platform charges a participation fee P i to each side i
but can also set a standard of quality ρi that all users have positive valuations for:
ui = vi
￿
ρi, N j ; θi
￿ − P i, and viρi > 0. Then, to insulate N i, the platform can
choose an unconditional level of ρi and a contingent schedule P i(N j), or it can set
an unconditional level of P i and use a conditional schedule of ρi(N j) to insulate.
It is possible, of course, that when P > K, using a particular set of K instruments
permits insulation, whereas a diﬀerent set of K instruments does not.
A number of additional conditions are required for dρ/dKT to be always well de-
fined, although their precise formulation is something we can only conjecture about
for the time being. First, dK/dρ must be invertible for every value of K, which
means that its eigenvalues can never be zero. Since dK/dρ captures the eﬀect of
10In W10, P = K is always satisfied and the insulating tariﬀ becomes dPdN = ￿uN − 1M ID , which
exists and is unique for each N .
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instruments on characteristics, and ∂K/∂KT captures the eﬀect of user expectations
on the realizations of the characteristics, we should intuitively require that instru-
ments have suﬃcient power to undo any eﬀect that a change in expectations might
have on the characteristics. That is, we require that dK/dρ is large, in some sense,
relative to ∂K/∂KT . We conjecture that the necessary condition involves bounding
the eigenvalues of dK/dρ away from zero, as well as assuring that those of of ∂K/∂KT
are not too large, relative to those of dK/dρ.
6. Applications
In this section, we use our framework to re-visit a number previous models and
consider them in the light of richly heterogeneous users. In doing so, we clarify
and illustrate the applicability of the results derived in Section 4. We assume all
quantities are well behaved and defined as above unless stated otherwise.
6.1. Newspaper Slant. Gentzkow & Shapiro (2010) test whether US newspapers’
political slants are profit maximizing. In their main model, the authors assume all
readers have the same value to the newspaper and, in a robustness check, they do
not reject this hypothesis. We oﬀer an interpretation of this robustness check using
the logic of our model. This application extends our analysis to a concrete multi-
sided setting, illustrates what is lost when types are uni-dimensional and shows how
the model is tractable when the number of instruments and characteristics diﬀer
(P ￿= K).
A monopoly newspaper determines its amount of (say, right-wing) slant s, its
price to readers (PR) and to advertisers (PA). There is a mass 1 of potential read-
ers, with types θR ∼ fR. Participating readers obtain utility uR = vR
￿
s;θR
￿
−PR,
since they have heterogeneous preferences over slant. Readers are also heteroge-
neous regarding their wealth, with reader θR having wealth w(θR). If participating
readers are the set ΘR, the total wealth of the readership is W =
￿
ΘR wf
R. There
is also a mass 1 of potential advertisers, with uni-dimensional types θA ∼ fA. Par-
ticipating advertisers have heterogenous preferences over wealth and obtain utility
uA = θAW − PA. For instance, wealthy readers may be particularly important
to sellers of luxury goods, but less important to sellers of basic necessities. Non-
participants obtain zero utility. The uni-dimensionality of advertiser types implies
all marginal advertisers are equal, so the corresponding covariance term vanishes
and there is no sorting on the advertiser side.11 It also implies￿uAW = PA/W . Letting
i ∈ {A,R}, we define N i = ￿Θi f i, M i = ￿∂Θi f i and µi = Ni/Mi. The newspaper’s
profit is Π =
￿
iN
iP i−C(NR, NA, s), where NA(PA,W ), NR(PR, s) and the cost
11This is the case, for instance, in Gomes & Pavan (2011).
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function C(·) may include, for instance, the disutility of slant to the newspaper’s
owner.
We focus on profit maximization. To derive the solution directly from Equa-
tion 4 we need P = K, so we twice consider an irrelevant characteristic, denoted
K0, that enters no preferences and to which all contributions are zero. Then, the
newspaper’s instruments are ρ =
￿
PA, PR, s
￿
, and K =
￿
W,K0,K0
￿
are the en-
dogenously determined characteristics. Since contributions are fixed, kρ = kK = 0.
Readers (the only agents making heterogeneous contributions) do not care about
any characteristics, so ΣuK ,k = 0. For the same reason ￿uKΣuρ,k = 0, so Γ = I.
Finally, dΠ/dW −￿uAW/￿uA
PA
· dΠ/dPA = PANA/W . Equation 4 becomes
PA − CNA − µA
PR − CNR − µR
PR − CNR − Cs
MR￿uRs
 = −

0 0 0￿w 0 0￿w + σRus,w￿us 0 0
 I

PA
W N
A
0
0
 .
Advertisers produce no externalities, so PA equates marginal revenue to marginal
cost: PA − µA = CNA . When setting PR, the newspaper considers the externality
of marginal readers to advertisers, to the extent that this can be captured by the
newspaper, thereby distorting in the spirit of Spence (1975): PR − µR − CNR =
− ￿wNAPA/W . The optimal amount of slant satisfies
Cs￿￿￿￿
disutility of
slant
= NR￿uRs￿ ￿￿ ￿
Spence distortion
to readers
+ MRσRus,w￿ ￿￿ ￿
sorting for wealth
by slant
PA
W
NA￿ ￿￿ ￿
Spence distortion
to advertisers
The disutility to slant is equated to the benefit it brings by attracting paying
readers, to the extent that their surplus can be captured (NR￿uRs ). Moreover, slant
sorts marginal readers and thereby aﬀects wealth proportionally to MRσRus,w. This
is internalized by the platform proportionally to the surplus of marginal advertisers,
illustrating the Spence distortion on the advertiser side.
Although one might conjecture that more conservative readers tend to be wealth-
ier and therefore of greater value to advertisers (σRus,w > 0), the robustness check
of Gentzkow & Shapiro (2010) shows that one cannot reject that σRus,w = 0 in
their data. This suggests that the assumption of homogenous readers is a good
approximation for the newspaper industry.
6.2. Broadcast Media. Firms are often restricted in the prices they can charge
to certain users, instead competing for those users along other dimensions. For in-
stance, inAnderson & Coate (2005), a TV network chooses an amount of advertising
but users cannot be charged for viewing while, in White (2008), a search engine
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charges advertisers, but users respond only to the quality of the search results.12
We model a two-sided platform restricted to a non-price instrument on one side,
which illustrates the importance of allowing for such instruments and clarifies the
role of the “excess covariance” term introduced in Section 4. This application also
introduces the “conversion factor” or “wedge” between user surplus and platform
profits, which becomes crucial when utility is imperfectly transferable. To fix ideas,
we will use the example of melodramatic radio soap operas mentioned in Section 1.
There is a mass 1 of advertisers and of listeners. A radio station charges price PA
to advertisers but cannot charge listeners. Instead, it attracts listeners by adjusting
the level of melodrama (m) in its programming. Listeners have types θL ∼ fL
while advertisers have uni-dimensional types θA ∼ fA. Listener θL controls family
disposable income in the amount of w(θL). Advertiser θA generates distraction
d(θA) towards users. For i ∈ {A,L}, we define Θi, N i, M i and µi as above. Then
the total wealth of listeners isW =
￿
ΘL wf
L, and the overall distraction of listeners
is D =
￿
ΘA df
A. Advertiser utility is uA = θAW −PA, while participating listeners
obtain uL(m,D;θL). The radio station’s profit is Π = NAPA − C(NA, NL,m),
where NA(W,PA), NL(D,m) and C(·) is the cost function.
We focus on profit maximization. The platform’s instruments are ρ =
￿
PA,m
￿
,
while characteristics K = (W,D) are determined endogenously. Equation 4 be-
comes
￿
PA − µA − CNA
− Cm
ML￿uLm − CNL
￿
= −
 0 ￿d￿w + σLum,w￿uLm 0
 1 0
ML
￿
σLuD,w −
σLum,w
￿uLD￿uLm
￿
1
 NAPAW￿uLDCm￿uLm

The optimal level of PA satisfies
PA − µA − CNA
−￿d = NL￿uLD￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
listeners
· Cm
NL￿uLm￿ ￿￿ ￿
conversion
into platform
profits
+ML
￿
σLuD,w − σLum,w
￿uLD￿uLm
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
sorting of listeners
for wealth
· P
ANA
W￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
advertisers
Marginal revenue (PA−µA) is equated to marginal cost (CNA) net of the amount of
externality generated by an additional advertiser (￿d) multiplied by the value of that
externality to the platform, the RHS. Increasing D repels listeners proportionally
to ￿uLD. Because the FOC is expressed in terms of an additional marginal user,
the platform adjusts melodrama (m) to maintain the number of listeners fixed.
The necessary adjustment in m is inversely proportional to the responsiveness of
listeners (￿uLm), but implies incurring the marginal cost Cm = dC/dm. Here, as in
White (2008), a platform adjusts its instrument on the user side to compensate for
12See alsoWhite & Jain (2010).
MULTIDIMENSIONAL HETEROGENEITY AND PLATFORM DESIGN 23
the presence of less valuable advertisers. The conversion factor Cm/NL￿uLm captures
the wedge between the surplus of listeners and the platform’s profit. When prices
are used, this conversion factor is equal to 1, as is the case on the advertiser side.
The excess covariance σLuD,w − σLum,w · ￿uLD/￿uLm captures the eﬀect of distraction D
on wealth W , considering that the platform adjusts m to hold fixed the number of
listeners. The adjustment is proportional to ￿uLD/￿uLm for the reason mentioned above.
The overall impact on W is therefore captured by the extent to which the users
repelled by distraction are wealthier than the users attracted by the compensating
change in melodrama. This term arises only in environments where instruments
aﬀect users heterogeneously, otherwise the second covariance vanishes.
The optimal level of melodrama satisfies
0￿￿￿￿
price
− Cm
ML￿uLm￿ ￿￿ ￿
pseudo
market power
−CNL = −
￿w + σLum,w￿ ￿￿ ￿
housewives’
spending power
 PANAW￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality
to advertisers
The expression is analogous to the typical equating of marginal revenue to marginal
cost net of externalities. Clearly, the marginal cost of an additional listener is CNL .
Typically, marginal revenue is price added to market power (N/M￿uP = −N/M),
which captures the cost of changing the instrument by the amount required to
attract an additional user. Here, there are no direct revenues from changing m,
by construction. However, increasing m to attract an additional listener implies
incurring the cost Cm. As in the case of prices, the necessary change is inversely
proportional to ML￿uLm for the reasons mentioned above.
Since users respond to changes in melodrama heterogeneously, the impact on
wealth of a change in melodrama that attracts an additional listener is the wealth
of the typical marginal listener, corrected by the covariance σLum,w. One might in-
terpret this term as the spending power of housewives, to the extent that they are
the ones with greater preference for melodrama. We conjecture that this term is
positive, which would explain radio station’s use of melodrama to attract female
listeners, since they would be the most valuable listeners to advertisers. The fi-
nal term, capturing the externality to advertisers, illustrates the familiar Spence
distortion.
When price enters the preferences of both users and the firm, these can be easily
compared. Determining the social optimum when utility is not transferable requires
additional assumptions, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
6.3. Credit Cards With Non-Linear Pricing. The large body of literature on
the credit card industry has tended to assume that all users have the same value to
merchants, and that this value is fixed for each user. For instance, Bedre-Defolie &
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Calvano (2010) find that, when homogenous users are charged a two-part tariﬀ, the
card issuer acts as a welfare maximizer towards users. We combine their framework
with elements Rochet & Stole (2002), and find that this result depends crucially
on the homogeneity assumption. This application illustrates the importance of
allowing user contributions to vary which, in this simple setup, oﬀers a way to
model user decisions with are not discrete.
There is a mass 1 of potential consumers with types θC ∼ fC , and of retailers
with uni-dimensional types θR ∼ fR. A credit card issuer charges consumers a per-
transaction fee p and a participation price PC (that is, a two-part tariﬀ).13 It also
charges retailers a participation price PR. User θC has a demand for transactions
q(p;θC), naturally depending on the fee p.14 If all retailers participate (NR = 1),
θC obtains a surplus of S
￿
p;θC
￿
=
￿∞
p q(pˆ;θ
C)dpˆ − pq(p;θC). When a fraction
NR of retailers participate, she obtains uC = NRS(p;θC) − PC . Total demand
for transactions is endogenously determined and defined as Q =
￿
ΘC q(p;θ
C)fC .
Retailers value the total demand for transactions, and obtain utility uR = θRQ −
PR. Letting i ∈ {C,R}, we define Θi, N i andM i in the usual way. A total of QNR
transactions occur, at a unit cost of c. Profit is Π =
￿
iN
iP i+(p− c)QNR, where
NC(PC , NR, p). By the envelope theorem, duC/dp = −NRq. Moreover, ￿uRQ = PR/Q
and ￿uCNR = PC/NR.
Consider first welfare maximization. The platform’s instruments are ρ =
￿
PR, PC , p
￿
,
and K =
￿
NR, Q,K0
￿
, where K0 is an irrelevant characteristics as above. Here
kK = 0. Equation 3 becomes
 P
R
PC
PC
 =

1 0 0
0 ￿q 0
0 ￿q + V (￿q)￿vCp + µC−NR￿q qp 0

 (p− c)Q+N
CS
(p− c)NR +NRvRQ
0

The welfare maximizing choices of ρ satisfy
PC = 0
PR = cQ￿￿￿￿
social cost
−NC ￿S + pq￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
all consumers
13Extending this model to more complex tariﬀs would oﬀer no additional insight, and few-part
tariﬀs are often a good approximation (see Wilson (1993)).
14In a more detailed model, consumer θC decides the number of transactions (t) and ob-
tains surplus q−1(t;θB) > 0 from her t-th transaction, for q−1 decreasing in t. Utility is
uC = maxtNR
￿￿ t
0 q
−1(tˆ;θC)dtˆ− pt
￿
− PC , consumer θC will perform transactions while
p ≤ q−1, and q(p;θB) is the solution to her maximization problem.
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p = c− θR￿￿￿￿
externality to
average retailer
Equating PC to zero maximizes welfare because there is no cost or externality of
an additional user (for Q held fixed). The eﬃcient level of PR is equal to the
marginal social cost of an additional retailer (cQ) net of the externality to all users
(NC
￿
S + pq
￿
). Finally, the transaction fee is set such that pNR = cNR −NRθR,
where
￿
p− cNR￿ is the profit from an increase in Q and NRθR is the externality
generated towards all retailers.
Consider now a profit maximizer. Equation 4 becomes
 P
R − µR
PC − µC
PC − Q￿qMC
 = −
 1 0 00 ￿q 0
0 ￿q + V (￿q)￿q + µC−NR￿q dqdp 0

 (p− c)Q+N
C ￿S
(p− c)NR +NR￿vRQ
0

The optimal level of PR and PC are
PR − µR = (c− p)Q￿ ￿￿ ￿
net private
transactional cost
− N
CPC
NR￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
consumers
PC − µC￿q = (c− p)NR￿ ￿￿ ￿
net private
transactional cost
− N
RPR
Q￿ ￿￿ ￿
externality to
retailers
The marginal revenue from an additional retailer (PR − µR) is equated to the net
marginal transaction costs incurred by the platform, net of externalities to all users
(NC), as experienced by marginal users (S(p; ￿θC) = PC/NR), as in Spence (1975).
The reasoning is similar for the profit maximizing PC except all costs, revenues and
externalities are proportional to the transactions performed by the typical marginal
user (￿q).
The optimal level of the transaction fee p satisfies
p = c− P
R
Q￿￿￿￿
Spence distortion
for retailers
+
Spence distortion
for consumers￿ ￿￿ ￿
1− ￿q
q
NR
p
￿X
V ar(￿q)￿q￿ ￿￿ ￿
extensive eﬀect
(sorting)
+
1
p
￿I￿￿￿￿
intensive eﬀect
(Mussa−Rosen−Wilson)
where ￿I = −dq/dp · p/q and ￿X = ￿qMCp/Q.
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The marginal cost of a transaction is c and ￿θR = PR/Q is the externality expe-
rienced by the typical marginal retailer from an additional transaction. The final
term refers to the revenue obtained from transaction fees, and reflects the hetero-
geneity of user demands for transactions and in the eﬀect of p on user demands.
Concerning the numerator, the platform increase p for larger values of the num-
ber of transaction of infra-marginal users (q), because these users are “captive.”
However, p decreases with ￿q because higher fees will cause marginal users to leave
the platform. The platform therefore caters to the tastes of marginal users in the
spirit of Spence (1973), although considering both marginal users (positively) and
infra-marginals (negatively).
These eﬀects are weighted then by the impact of p on marginal users leaving the
platform, and on infra-marginal users reducing their comsumption, as captured by
the numerator. The “exiting” elasticity of Q is ￿X = ￿qMCp/Q, where ￿qMC is the
change in Q caused by departing marginal users. However, a unit increase in p
does not aﬀect all marginal users equally, since they execute diﬀerent numbers of
transactions. The exiting eﬀect is therefore proportional to σCup,q = −NRVar(￿q), by
the envelope theorem. It is in this sense that our model resembles Rochet & Stole
(2002). When marginal users have disparate levels of consumption (Var(￿q) large),
increasing p will repel most strongly those marginal users who most contribute
to Q, so the profit maximizing level of p is inversely proportional to this variance.
The second mechanism reflects the fact that infra-marginal users will decrease their
number of transactions fllowing an increase in p. The term ￿I = −dq/dp · p/q is the
average “intensive” elasticity of transactions, capturing the extent to which the
average user changes her consumption with response to a change in p. The optimal
level of the transaction fee is intuitively inversely proportional to this quantity. This
consideration of the eﬀects of per unit prices on the consumption of infra-marginal
users is typical of non-linear pricing, in the tradition of Mussa & Rosen (1978) and
Wilson (1993).
Notice that, in Bedre-Defolie & Calvano (2010), user contributions are homoge-
neous, so q = ￿q and the last term vanishes. In that case, the optimal level of p is
not distorted based on the user’s preferences, so the platform acts like a welfare
maximizer towards users, as that paper concludes.
6.4. Insurance Cream-Skimming. The remain two applications depart from our
general framework in that they discuss a simple duopoly. We show that introducing
competition is straightforward in the case where characteristics do not enter user
preferences, by revisiting the classical model of insurance competition of RS76.15
We allow for flexible user heterogeneity and, in particular, allow the individual cost
15When this is not the case, a number of complications arise, as discussed in White & Weyl (2011).
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of coverage to change, which provides a simple way to model moral hazard. We
identify the cream-skimming distortion of RS76 (absent from models of platform
competition like White & Weyl (2011)), quantify the propensity for market failure,
and identify a pricing distortion in the spirit of Akerlof (1970).
Two insurers, indexed by i, j ∈ {A,B}, each oﬀer a policy defined by a price-
coverage pair
￿
P i, ρi
￿
. A mass 1 of potential users have types θ ∼ f . The parameter
θ will typically include the user’s relative preference over insurers, her risk aversion,
propensity for moral hazard and coverage cost. If user θ joins insurer i, she obtains
u = v
￿
ρi;θ
￿−P i = vi−P i. Outside options are zero, so the participants of insurer
i are Θi =
￿
θ : vi − P i ≥Min￿vj − P j , 0￿￿. User θ’s expected cost of provision
by an insurer with coverage ρ is c(ρ,θ), that is, cost depends on the level of coverage
but not on the insurer. The eﬀect of ρ on c(·,θ) can be understood as the cost or
providing additional coverage, as well as the cost of the associated increase in user
moral hazard. We will focus on the second interpretation for concreteness. Insurer
i’s total cost is Ci =
￿
Θi c
￿
ρi,θ
￿
f , and its profit is Πi = N iP i − Ci.
Because of competition, we must diﬀerentiate between the “expansion margin”
of i (users indiﬀerent between joining i and remaining uninsured) and the “switch-
ing margin” of i (users indiﬀerent between i and j). The former is ∂ΘXi =￿
θ : vi = P i, vj < P j
￿
, while the latter is ∂ΘS =
￿
θ : vi − P i = vj − P j > 0￿. We
defineN i, MXi andMS in the usual way. We focus on the symmetrical equilibrium
and optimum, where both insurers oﬀer the same price-coverage pair (heterogeneous
preferences for an insurer still typically imply Θi ￿= Θj).
Consider a welfare maximizing insurer choosing ρi =
￿
P i, ρi
￿
to maximize W =￿
i
￿￿
Θi v
￿
ρi;θ
￿
f − Ci￿. By symmetry, the eﬀect of users switching along ∂ΘS
are welfare-neutral. Since ρi aﬀects only the participants of i, welfare maximization
considers only its participants (Θi) and the expansion margin ∂ΘXi. Equation 3
becomes
￿
−N i
N iviρi
￿
+
 N i −MXiP i +MXi￿cXi
MXi￿viρiXiP i +MXi￿viρicXi −N iciρi
 = 0
where ￿cXi = E ￿c | ∂ΘXi￿ and similarly for ￿viρiXi. The welfare maximizing ρi
satisfies
P i = ￿cXi￿￿￿￿
social
marginal cost
N iviρi￿ ￿￿ ￿
social marginal
benefit
− N iciρi￿ ￿￿ ￿
moral
hazard
= MXiσXiuρi ,ci￿ ￿￿ ￿
eﬃcient
cream-skimming
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where σXiuρi ,ci = Cov(uρi , c
i | ∂ΘXi). Price is equated to the marginal cost of the
typical user admitted from the expansion margin, for the reasons discussed above.
The welfare maximizing coverage considers the benefit of additional coverage to all
users (N iviρi) net of the additional cost from exacerbated moral hazard (N
iciρi).
Additionally, the optimal level of coverage takes into consideration the extent to
which greater coverage sorts for high costs participants along the expansion margin
(MXiσXiuρi ,ci). Selection is adverse if σ
Xi
uρi ,c
i > 0 and advantageous otherwise. That
is, if the marginal users most attracted by coverage are particularly unhealthy,
this increase in costs must be taken into account when setting ρi. Alternatively,
if ∂ΘXi contains health-conscious users who enjoy coverage but are quite healthy,
selection will be advantageous. Notice that even a welfare maximizer engages in
some amount of “cream skimming,” along the expansion margin.
Conversely, a profit maximizing oligopolist considers its entire margin ∂Θi =
∂ΘS ∪ ∂ΘXi. Then, Equation 4 is
 N i −MXi ￿P i − ￿cXi￿−MS ￿P i − ￿cS￿
MXi
￿
P i￿viρiXi −￿cviρiXi￿+MS ￿P i￿viρiS −￿cviρiS￿−N iciρi
 = 0
The levels of ρi that maximize profit satisfy
P i − µS+Xi￿ ￿￿ ￿
Cournot
distortion
= MXi￿cXi + MS￿cS￿ ￿￿ ￿
Akerloﬀ distortion
N i ￿viρiS+Xi￿ ￿￿ ￿
Spence
distortion
− N iciρi￿ ￿￿ ￿
moral
hazard
= MXiσXiuρi ,ci￿ ￿￿ ￿
eﬃcient
cream-skimming
+ MSσSuρi ,ci￿ ￿￿ ￿
Rothschild-Stiglitz
distortion
where σSuρi ,ci = Cov(v
i
ρi , c
i | ∂ΘS+Xi). A profit maximizer’s price takes into account
its market power on both margins (µS+Xi = Ni/MS+MXi). Such an insurer also
departs from eﬃciency by considering the socially neutral costs along the switching
margin (￿cS). Since users infra-marginal to the market as a whole are likely to be
more costly than marginal users (when selection is adverse), considering the price
incurred from the former leads to higher prices and underprovision, as described
in Akerlof (1970) and Einav et al. (2010). A profit maximizer’s optimal coverage
considers the benefits as measured by its marginal users (￿vS+Xiρi ), as in Spence
(1975). It also considers ρi’s sorting for high-cost users along both the market
expansion margin (σXiuρi ,ci), and the switching margin (σ
S
uρi ,c
i). As in RS76, a
competitive firm does not take into account the extent to which it “cream-skimms”
from its competitors and the impact this has on their profits.
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The results highlight the impact of competition on the various distortions. In the
competitive limit all users are on some switching margin so MS → ∞. Switching
users are marginal to the market as a whole, so they tend to be more similar
to average users than to marginal users. Therefore, competition mitigates the
Spence distortion but exacerbates the Akerloﬀ distortion. Moreover, µS+Xi → 0
with competition, so the Cournot distortion is reduced competition. Finally, when
MS = ∞, the profit maximizing condition for ρi has no solution and the market
collapses, as in RS76.
6.5. College Admissions. The matching of students to colleges has been the topic
of a large literature, from Gale & Shapley (1962) and Roth & Sotomayor (1989)
to Azevedo & Leshno (2011). We depart from our main model by introducing
competition and also by assuming user types are not private information. This will
imply that a change in a college’s instruments will attract students proportionally to
their value to the college, not proportionally to student preferences. We build upon
the framework of Azevedo (2011) by using a competitive matching model where, in
equilibrium, platforms accept all users with values to the platform above a chosen
threshold. We extend this model by allowing users to have multi-dimensional types,
and allowing colleges to have preferences over the composition of their class, rather
than over individual students.
There is a mass 1 of potential students with types θ ∼ f , which are observable by
the colleges (through their admissions processes). Student θ has humanities talent
h(θ) and technical talent t(θ). There are two colleges, indexed by i, j ∈ {A,B}. If
Θi is the set of students joining college i, its overall humanities and technical talents
are Hi =
￿
Θi hf and T
i =
￿
Θi tf , respectively. College i’s payoﬀ is its reputation,
Ri
￿
Hi, T i
￿
. We assume RiHi > 0 and R
i
T i > 0, and also assume R
i(x, y) =
Rj(y, x), that is, colleges are symmetrically diﬀerentiated in their specialization.
Let ri(θ) = RiHih(θ) + R
i
T it(θ) be the marginal contribution of student θ to the
reputation of college i. In the spirit of Azevedo (2011), each college i decides
its admissions threshold, ai, such that it accepts only those students for whom
ri(θ) ≥ ai.16 College i can also choose its humanities emphasis ei, that is, the
share of its total budget (normalized to 1) that it allocates to humanities programs,
with 1−ei being allocated to technical programs. Therefore, college i’s instruments
are ρi =
￿
ai, ei
￿
.17 Student θ joining college i obtains utility u
￿
ei;θ
￿
= ui > 0,
and outside options are zero. That is, students may have a preference for a given
college, they may have heterogeneous preferences over the emphasis of the college
16We assume that each college i is truthful, in the sense that it would not reject a student with
high r but accept one with lower r. This could trigger a rejection chain that could ultimately
benefit college i, but we abstract from this possibility as does most of the literature.
17We assume tuition payments are of second order importance to students and colleges.
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they attend (ei) and they always prefer to attend some college rather than none.
However, students do not care about the characteristics of the student body of
the college they attend (Hi and T i). Student θ may be rejected by both colleges
(ri < ai, rj < aj), be accepted by just one college, or be accepted by both and
attend whichever college she prefers. Therefore, the participants of college i is the
set Θi =
￿
θ : ri ≥ ai, rj < aj￿ ∪ ￿θ : ri ≥ ai, rj > aj , ui > uj￿ .18
It is useful to partition the margin of i into 3 subsets. The “expansion” margin,
∂ΘXi =
￿
θ : ri = ai, rj < aj
￿
, is composed of students who would stop partici-
pating altogether if ai is raised. Then, ∂ΘRi =
￿
θ : ri = ai, rj > aj , ui > uj
￿
is
the “rejected” margin, composed of students who would switch to j if ai is raised.
Neither of these groups is aﬀected by changes in the emphasis ei. The “voluntary”
margin, ∂ΘV =
￿
θ : ri > ai, rj > rj , ui = uj
￿
is common to both colleges and com-
posed of those students accepted by both colleges and indiﬀerent between them,
who would respond to a change in ei. We define N i,MXi,MRi,MV in the usual
way. College i’s payoﬀ is Πi = Ri − cN i, where accommodating each student costs
c. This allows colleges to have preferences about the overall composition of their
student bodies.
We focus on the symmetrically diﬀerentiated equilibrium where li = 1 − lj and
ai = aj . We also assume that students are symmetrically distributed in the joint
permutation of colleges and contributions.19 This implies MXi = MXj , MRi =
MRj , Hi = T j , Hj = T i, RiH = R
j
T and RiT = R
j
H . This setup being significantly
diﬀerent from our main model, we will not use Equations 3 and 4.
Consider college i choosing ρi to maximize W =
￿
i
￿￿
Θi uf +R
i − cN i￿. The
choice of emphasis ei aﬀects all of its participants (Θi) and may cause students
along ∂ΘV to switch colleges. By symmetry, ui = uj within ∂ΘV , and ￿hV = ￿tV .
The welfare maximizing level of ei satisfies
MV
￿
RiH −RiT
￿ ￿
σVue,h − σVue,t
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
socially eﬃcient
college diversification
= − N iuie￿ ￿￿ ￿
benefit to all
students in i
The humanities talent attracted to i by a shift in the college’s emphasis (ei), has
an impact on i’s reputation proportional to RiHσVue,h and, similarly, the technical
talent attracted has a value of RiTσVue,t. By the assumption of symmetry, students
switching colleges along ∂ΘV will have the same eﬀects on the reputations of both
colleges. That is, if i chooses ei to sort for technically gifted students valuable to
18Notice that sets defined by two equalities, such as
￿
ri = ai, rj = aj
￿
, have dimension T −2 and
therefore zero measure even in the context of first derivatives.
19For every student θ with contributions h(θ), t(θ) and preferences u(li,θ), u(lj ,θ), there is a
student θ￿ with symmetrical contributions h(θ￿) = t(θ) and t(θ￿) = h(θ), and symmetrical pref-
erences u(li,θ) = u(lj ,θ￿) and u(lj ,θ) = u(li,θ￿), and f(θ) = f(θ￿).
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i, then students with large humanities talent sorted into j will be equally valuable
to j. Of course, a change in ei also aﬀects all students of i (N iuie).
A small change in the admissions criteria ai aﬀects the sets ∂ΘXi and ∂ΘRi,
where πi = ai. The eﬃcient level of ai satisfies
MXi ￿uiXi￿ ￿￿ ￿
inclusion benefits
to students
+MXi
￿￿riXi − c￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
net inclusion
benefits to i
+MRi
￿￿uiRi − ￿ujRi￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
allocation benefits
to students
= MRi
￿
RiHi −RiT i
￿ ￿￿hRi − ￿tRi￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
net allocation costs
to colleges
Since marginal users do not have zero utility, relaxing the admissions strictness of
i allows students along ∂ΘXi to attend some college, adding MXi ￿uiXi to social
welfare. Moreover, college i obtains the reputational benefit from these additional
students (￿riXi), despite having to pay the cost of c per student. Then, students
along ∂ΘRi are now able to attend their preferred college, producing a social gain of￿uiRi− ￿ujRi > 0. However, when i poaches students from j, these are infra-marginal
to j but marginal (and therefore of lower value) to i. This implies a cost to the
colleges of allowing students to be allocated according to their own preferences,
rather than the colleges’: the RHS equals MRi
￿￿rjRi − ￿aiRi￿ < 0.
Consider now college i choosing ρi to maximize Πi = Ri − cN i. Its choice of
emphasis ei satisfies
RiHiσ
V
ue,h +R
i
T iσ
V
ue,t￿ ￿￿ ￿
privately eﬃcient
college diversification
= ￿ueV￿￿￿￿
Spence
distortion
￿
c− ￿riV ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
net private cost
of diversification
A reputation maximizing college does not take into account that it’s own diversifi-
cation has a symmetrical impact on the reputation of its competitors and therefore
is under-diversified. The Spence distortion can be seen in the fact that such a col-
lege does not take into account the surplus of infra-marginal students, insteading
considering the preferences of students on the voluntary margin.
The reputation maximizing level of ai satisfies
￿riXi+Ri￿ ￿￿ ￿
private benefit of
inclusion
= c
A reputation maximizer considers neither the welfare of non-participating students,
nor of students not attending their preferred college. It also does not take into
account the eﬀect that poaching (infra-marginal) students from its competitor de-
creases its payoﬀ. Finally, a payoﬀ maximizer considers private costs, which include
those of students on the rejected margin.
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7. Conclusion
We have set up a simple and flexible framework to analyse private and social op-
timality conditions in platform industries, while allowing users to be heterogeneous
in their preferences and in their value to other users and to the platform. We also
allow platforms to have flexible payoﬀ functions and to use price or non-price in-
struments to screen users. Finally, we discuss conditions under which the platform
can implement its desired allocation uniquely and illustrate the applicability of the
model through a series of short applications.
Our optimality conditions depend crucially on the sorting eﬀect of changes in
instruments or characteristics among marginal users. This eﬀect is quantified by
the covariance, within that set, between user preferences and contributions to the
platform’s endogenously determined characteristics. We thus provide a characteri-
zation that is general, simple, and empirically tractable.
Promising directions for future work include the full generalization of the ap-
proach to the case of competition. While we show this is straightforward to do
when platform characteristics do not enter user preferences, relaxing that assump-
tion would require addressing the coordination problems between users, as discussed
by White & Weyl (2011) in a more restricted environment.
Allowing users to make non-discrete decisions is also an exciting path for fu-
ture work. While our framework can accomodate simple reaction rules as those
illustrated in Sub-Section 6.3, generalizing this aspect of the model would require
allowing for a broader class of envelope conditions on the part of users.
The empirical calibration of the model is also an important direction in which to
proceed. Our hope is that our reliance on simple moments of the distribution of user
heterogeneity will facilitate future empirical research on industries from insurance
to broadcast media.
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